Mars Home For Youth v. NLRB by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-19-2012 
Mars Home For Youth v. NLRB 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Mars Home For Youth v. NLRB" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1483. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1483 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1250 
_____________ 
 
 
MARS HOME FOR YOUTH, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
 
Respondent 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIAL SERVICES UNION, 
LOCAL 668 OF 
THE SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
 
Intervenor 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1590 
_____________ 
 
 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
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Petitioner 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIAL SERVICES UNION, 
LOCAL 668 OF 
THE SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
 
Intervenor 
v. 
 
MARS HOME FOR YOUTH, 
 
Respondent 
 
_____________ 
 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-
APPLICATION 
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
October 5, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 26, 2011) 
 
Ronald J. Andrykovitch, Esq. 
Jessi D. Isenhart, Esq. 
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Cohen & Grigsby 
625 Liberty Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
 Counsel for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent 
 
Ruth E. Burdick, Esq. 
National Labor Relations Board 
Appellate and Supreme Court Litigation Branch, Division of 
Enforcement 
1099 14th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20570-0001 
 
Linda Dreeben, Esq. 
MacKenzie Fillow, Esq. 
National Labor Relations Board 
Room 8100 
1099 14th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20570 
 
Amy H. Ginn, Esq. 
Jill A. Griffin, Esq. 
National Labor Relations Board 
Appellate Court Branch 
1099 14th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20570-0000 
  
 Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner 
 
Claudia Davidson, Esq. 
500 Law & Finance Building 
429 Fourth Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000 
4 
 
  
Counsel for Intervenor-Respondent The Pennslyvania 
Social Services Union, Local 668 of the Service 
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO.  
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Mars Home for Youth filed a Petition for Review of a 
final decision and order of the National Labor Relations 
Board (the “Board”).  The Board filed a Cross Application for 
Enforcement.  Mars Home seeks review of the Board’s 
determination that five Assistant Residential Program 
Mangers (“assistant managers”) were not “supervisors” under 
Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (the 
“Act”), and thus were able to participate in a unionizing vote.  
We reject Mars Home’s petition and grant the Board’s cross-
application for enforcement. 
 
I. 
 
Mars Home for Youth is a facility that provides 
residential and other services to at-risk juveniles.  Each of the 
six residential units is staffed by a residential program 
manager (“program managers”), an assistant residential 
program manager, and resident assistants (“assistants”).  The 
assistants report to the assistant managers who, in turn, report 
to the program manager.  
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 The Pennsylvania Social Services Union Local 669 
a/w Service Employees International Union a/w CTW 
(“Union”) filed a petition before the National Labor Relations 
Board seeking to represent the assistants and assistant 
managers as a collective bargaining unit.  Mars Home 
opposed the inclusion of the assistant managers on the basis 
that they were supervisors.  After a hearing, the Regional 
Director of the NLRB issued a decision finding that the five 
assistant managers were not supervisors and could be 
included in the collective bargaining unit.  Mars Home timely 
sought review of the decision, which was denied.   
 
 Union elections were held and the group voted 34-31 
in favor of allowing the Union to represent them collectively.  
The NLRB certified the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees.  Mars Home 
refused to bargain, contending that the certification was 
invalid.  
 
 The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge and the 
NLRB issued a complaint against Mars Home alleging that its 
refusal to bargain violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the 
National Labor Relations Act.  The Board found that Mars 
Home violated the Act and issued a cease and desist order.  
Mars Home timely petitioned this Court and the Board cross-
petitioned for enforcement of its order.
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II. 
 
                                              
1
  We exercise jurisdiction over the appeal of the Board’s 
decision pursuant to Sections 10(e) and (f) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f).   
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 Our review of the National Labor Relations Board’s 
decisions is limited.  We “accept the Board’s factual 
determinations and reasonable inferences derived from 
factual determinations if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.” Citizens Publishing and Printing Co. v. NLRB, 
263 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).  Substantial evidence is 
“more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Id.  We uphold the Board’s conclusions of fact 
“even if we would have made a contrary determination had 
the matter been before us de novo.”  Id.  The Board’s legal 
determinations are subject to plenary review, but “with due 
deference to the Board’s expertise in labor matters.” NLRB v. 
St. George Warehouse, Inc., 645 F.3d 666, 671 (3d Cir. 
2011).  We uphold the Board’s interpretations of the Act if 
they are reasonable.  Citizens Publishing and Printing Co., 
263 F.3d at 233.  We have cautioned that “determinations 
respecting supervisor status are particularly suited to the 
Board’s expertise.”  NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 
519, 532 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
III. 
 
 To be entitled to the Act’s protections and includable 
in a bargaining unit, one must be an “employee” as defined 
by the Act.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2(3), 152(3); see also NLRB v. 
Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001).  
The definition of “employee” does not include “supervisors.” 
See id. at § 152(3).  A supervisor is: 
 
any individual having authority, in the interest 
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay 
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, 
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or discipline other employees, or responsibly to 
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or 
effectively to recommend such action, if in 
connection with the foregoing the exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment.  
 
29 U.S.C. § 152(11).  Whether someone is a supervisor is a 
question of fact, and thus will be upheld if it is supported by 
substantial evidence.  See W.C. McQuiade, Inc., 552 F.2d at 
532-33; NLRB v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d 68, 75 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Entergy Gulf States., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 203, 
208 (5th Cir. 2001). There is a three-part test for determining 
supervisory status.  Employees are supervisors if: “(1) they 
hold the authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 listed 
supervisory functions, (2) their exercise of such authority is 
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use 
of independent judgment, and (3) their authority is held in the 
interest of the employer.”  Kentucky River, 532 U.S. at 713 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  A supervisor exercises 
independent judgment when he acts or recommends action 
“free of the control of others and form[s] an opinion or 
evaluation by discerning and comparing data.”  In re 
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 692-93 (2006).  
As the party asserting it, Mars Home bears the burden of 
establishing supervisory status.  Kentucky River, 532 U.S. at  
711-12.   
 
 Mars Home alleges that the assistant managers were 
supervisors under the Act because they responsibly directed 
the work of employees, assigned employees and had the 
authority to discipline them.  We disagree. 
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A. 
 
 Mars Home contends that the Board erred when it 
found that it had not met its burden of producing sufficient 
evidence to establish that the assistant managers “responsibly 
direct” the assistant’s work.   
 
 The Board, held that for direction to be responsible, 
“the person directing and performing the oversight of the 
employee must be accountable for the performance of the task 
by the other, such that some adverse consequence may befall 
the one providing the oversight if the tasks performed by the 
employee are not performed properly.”2 In re Oakwood 
Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 691-92 (2006).  The 
putative supervisor must be at risk of suffering adverse 
consequences for the actual performance of others, not his 
own performance in overseeing others.  Id. at 695.   
 
 The record before the Board contained numerous 
examples of where assistant managers were not disciplined 
for the failure of resident assistants to follow their directions.  
Rather, the record shows that the assistant managers were 
disciplined for their own failings as managers.   
                                              
2
  The term “responsibly to direct” is ambiguous.  NLRB 
v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 579 
(1994).  Thus the Board’s interpretation is entitled to 
deference so long as it is reasonable.  See Fei Mei Cheng v. 
Att’y General, 623 F.3d 175, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2010).  We find 
that the Board’s interpretation to be reasonable and thus 
entitled to deference. See e.g., Loparex LLC v. NLRB, 591 
F.3d 540, 550 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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Mars Home’s argument that it implemented an 
evaluation system that encompassed the assistant manager’s 
responsible direction is similarly unavailing.  The change has 
yet to be implemented.  Further, the evaluation form, which 
will form the basis of these pay raises, does not evaluate the 
assistant managers on their responsible direction.  The only 
relevant category is “interpersonal relationships,” but Mars 
Home points to no evidence in the record that indicates how 
the program managers use this category, or any other, in 
evaluating the assistant managers’ directing others. 
 
Overall, the Board’s determination that Mars Home 
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the assistant 
managers are supervisors because they responsibly direct 
others is supported by substantial evidence and should not be 
disturbed. 
 
B. 
 
Mars Home further alleges that the assistant managers 
are supervisors under Section 2(11) of the National Labor 
Relations Act because they possess the authority to assign 
assistants to various tasks.   
 
The Board has construed the term “assign” to “refer to 
the act of designating an employee to a place . . ., appointing 
an employee to a time, . . . or giving significant overall duties, 
i.e., tasks, to an employee.”3 Oakwood Health, 348 NLRB at 
                                              
3
  Similar to “responsibly to direct,” the phrase “assign” 
is ambiguous and thus the Board’s interpretation is upheld if 
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689.  A supervisor designates “significant overall duties to an 
employee” not simply “instructions that an employee perform 
a discrete task.”  Id.  A supervisor must have the power to 
require that these duties be undertaken.  Golden Crest, 348 
NLRB at 729.  
 
As to scheduling, there is sufficient evidence in the 
record that only some assistant managers had the authority to 
recommend an assistant’s schedule, which was later reviewed 
and approved by the program manager, and they had no 
authority to require the assistant to follow certain schedules.  
See Golden Crest, 348 NLRB at 729 (finding no authority to 
assign when only another held the power to mandate).  
Further, the schedules are constrained by significant 
Government and Mars Home regulations, which cuts against 
finding that the assistant managers acted with independent 
judgment.   
 
Part of the assistant manager’s duties is to make sure 
that the resident halls are adequately staffed at all times.  If 
assistants are absent, an assistant manager may either let the 
unit run short-staffed, assuming it still has the required staff-
to-resident ratio, pull an assistant from another unit, or find a 
volunteer.  When seeking volunteers, it is Mars Home’s 
informal policy that the assistant manager call the most junior 
assistant first and that no employee may work for more than 
16 consecutive hours.  A program manager must approve any 
overtime.   
 
                                                                                                     
it is reasonable.  We find that it is and thus is entitled to 
deference.  
11 
 
Also, there is sufficient evidence in the record that 
demonstrates the assistant managers do not have the authority 
to assign transportation duty to the assistants.  In fact, one 
assistant manager testified that when a resident needs to be 
transported he simply asks for volunteers and bases any 
staffing decisions on the gender of the patient.  
 
Finally, the Board’s interpretation that daily work 
schedules, such as assigning an assistant to monitor a single 
resident or to respond to a crisis constituted evidence of 
direction, not assignment, is not unreasonable.  The Board has 
interpreted assignment to mean the allocation of significant 
overall responsibilities to an employee, not ad hoc duties.  
Oakwood Health, 348 NLRB at 689.  Here, it is plain that the 
assistant managers are giving only ad hoc duties, which is not 
evidence of the authority to assign under the Act.  
 
Based on the above, the Board’s conclusion that the 
assistant managers lack the authority to assign under Section 
2(11) or did not use independent judgment is supported by 
substantial evidence and will not be overturned.    
 
IV. 
 
We have considered Mars Home’s remaining claims 
and find them without merit.  Mars Home for Youth’s 
Petition for Review is DENIED.  The National Labor 
Relations Board’s Cross-Application for Enforcement of its 
Order is GRANTED.   
